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A proposal for unitary
taxes on the profits 
of transnational corporations
Andrew Mold
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries has been
increasing at an unprecedented rate, and the profitability of the
operations of the investing firms in poor regions like Sub-Saharan
Africa is extraordinarily high. Yet at the same time there is growing
evidence that transnational corporations (TNCs) are paying less and
less in terms of tax. The developing countries in particular have suf-
fered from this —it has been estimated that developing country gov-
ernments lose at least US$35 billion a year of revenue through tax
avoidance practices. This paper presents empirical evidence and a
proposal for applying a unitary tax system on the profits of TNCs.
Such a system would eliminate one of the most powerful mecha-
nisms at the disposal of TNCs for illegally avoiding tax payments—
transfer pricing. The paper concludes by arguing that a proposal for
a unitary tax system on a worldwide basis may be sufficient to
unblock the negotiations on a multilateral investment code.
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After a lost decade of structural adjustment and reduc-
tions in government expenditure, there is a growing
acknowledgement that developing countries should be
searching for new sources of revenue. It has recently
been estimated, for example, that there is a shortfall of
up to US$80 billion per year in developing countries
between what is spent and what should be spent to
ensure universal access to basic health and education
(Mehrotra, Vandemoortele and Delamonica, 2000).
Yet as a result of continuous pressure from the inter-
national financial institutions to reduce expenditure,
the capacity of the State to provide such services has
been seriously weakened in many regions. 
Indeed, in some countries revenues are so low
that the State is in danger of disintegrating. In
Guatemala, for instance, State expenditure currently
barely reaches 10% of GDP, and the government has
apparently given up any pretence of meeting its obli-
gations with regard to the provision of basic social
services, shifting its responsibilities onto the NGO
sector: a role which NGOs are obviously ill-equipped
to fulfill. In a similar vein, commenting on the case of
Mexico, the ex-President of Uruguay Julio María
Sanguinetti recently asked “how is it possible to carry
out social programmes in Chiapas when the fiscal
pressure of the Mexican State is equivalent to only
10% of GDP?” 1 The irony is that these trends have
coincided with a growing consensus on the need to
build up State and institutional capacity if any
progress is to be made in the eradication of poverty.
Increasingly, the international financial institutions
and many donor governments are putting emphasis on
“getting the institutions right” and attaching “gover-
nance-related conditionalities”, but there seems to be
little predisposition towards finding new ways to pro-
vide the necessary finance to support these changes.
In such a context, it seems only logical to place
more emphasis on revenue-creating strategies.
Ambitious proposals for taxes to help finance devel-
opment such as the Tobin Tax have apparently fallen
by the wayside, in part because of doubts about their
effectiveness, and in part simply because of a lack of
political will to push the proposals through.2 Little
attention, on the other hand, has been paid to the pos-
sibility of increasing tax revenue through more effi-
cient taxation of the operations of transnational corpo-
rations (TNCs). Foreign direct investment (FDI)
towards developing countries has increased more than
fourfold since the early 1990s (from an average of
US$ 47 billion between 1988-1993 to US$ 238 billion
in 2000 (UNCTAD, 2002, Annex, Table B.1.). The
growing globalization of international production con-
fers enormous benefits on TNCs. Facilitated by liber-
alization and structural adjustment programmes, they
have been able to enter new markets in developing
countries, and have participated in privatization pro-
grammes, buying public assets often at highly
favourable prices. Reflecting the opportunities avail-
able, and contrary to popular opinion, in developing
regions profitability can be extraordinarily high. For
example, data for United States companies reveal an
average profit rate for operations in Sub-Saharan
Africa in excess of 25% over the last five years (Mold,
2001). In other words, companies recover their initial
investment in just four years. Clearly, globalization
has been good for the largest TNCs.
Yet there are signs that the boom in FDI has been
accompanied by a growing ability of TNCs to avoid
tax payments in the jurisdictions where they have
operations. Some of the evidence is anecdotal. For
instance, a few years ago it was revealed that
Newscorp Investments, a holding company with 101
subsidiaries owned by the Australian media tycoon
Rupert Murdoch, had made £1.4 billion in profits
since June 1987, but had paid no net British corpora-
tion tax at all (The Economist, 1999). The situation
clearly has to be explained in terms of the company’s
extensive use of tax loopholes to shelter profits in tax
havens. 
Newscorp Investments is far from an isolated
example. A systematic study in the United States
(McIntyre and Nguyen, 2000) found that household
names such as Goodyear, Texaco, Colgate-Palmolive,
MCI WorldCom and eight other large corporations
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1 See El país 2001  p. 7.
I
Introduction
2 For a discussion of the practicalities involved  see Haq  Kaul and
Grunberg (1996).
earned more than US$12.2 billion in profits in the
period from 1996-98, but none of them ended up pay-
ing corporate income taxes in the United States over
the same period. Of the 250 large publicly traded com-
panies analyzed in the study, a total of 24 owed no tax
or received credits against past or future tax obliga-
tions in 1998, and 71 paid taxes at less than half the
official 35% corporate rate during the three-year peri-
od. Similarly, a study by Altshuler, Grubert and
Newlon (1998) on the effective tax rates paid abroad
by large United States manufacturing affiliates
revealed that average rates had fallen by more than 15
percentage points between 1984 and 1992. 
Developing countries are particularly vulnerable
to this type of tax avoidance strategies. Although the
level of fiscal pressure is generally lower than in
industrialized countries, they have far less institution-
al capacity to control tax evasion. Typically, they lack
sufficient information from the parent company to be
able to challenge transfer pricing and other forms of
tax avoidance. Much of their FDI is located in sectors
like the oil industry, electronics and forestry products,
where the potential for tax avoidance is high. Because
a considerable share of total developing country trade
is under the control of TNCs, such countries are typi-
cally more vulnerable to tax avoidance practices
through the over- or under- invoicing of imports and
exports. 
Moreover, in many developing countries a com-
bination of low corporate taxes and the extensive use
of tax breaks and tax holidays to attract foreign invest-
ment has meant that TNCs have reduced their tax lia-
bilities dramatically. One of the most extreme cases is
that of the 15 export processing zones/free trade zones
set up in Honduras, where foreign firms have been
granted permanent exemption from all taxes. But tax
holidays of between 10-20 years are nowadays fairly
commonplace in developing countries.3 Sri Lanka, for
example, has 6 export processing zones (EPZs) which
enjoy 10 to 20 year holidays for new large export proj-
ects or selected industries. These initiatives continue,
in spite of an emerging consensus that, from a devel-
opmental perspective, these kinds of measures are
ineffective or even counterproductive in the long run.4
These trends should force policy makers to consider
alternative methods of raising revenue. The existing
system is clearly failing in terms of equity. This is true
both from the point of view of what we could call
internal and international equity- internal equity in the
sense that within individual countries wage earners are
increasingly having to finance through taxes the bulk
of government expenditure, whereas internationally
mobile capital is benefiting from a reduction in effec-
tive tax rates, and international equity in so far as there
is evidence that tax income from TNC operations has
been falling more rapidly in developing countries than
in the industrialized countries. Indeed, the only “win-
ners” in all this are the TNCs themselves and the tax
havens with the lowest effective tax rates. Thus,
whereas stocks of FDI for the world as a whole
increased approximately ten-fold over the period from
1980 to 2000, the Cayman Islands experienced a more
than 100-fold increase, to US$24.9 billion. With a
population of only 36,000, this represents a massive
US$700,000 of foreign investment per inhabitant.
Similarly, Bermuda’s investment stock rose US$10
billion in just one year, from 2000 to 2001, and now
stands at a total of more than US$66 billion. To put
these figures in perspective, this is higher than the
US$50 billion investment stock for the whole of Japan
and, for a population of just 64,000, represents more
than US$1 million per inhabitant (UNCTAD, 2002,
Table B.3). 
Beyond straightforward fraud, one of the princi-
pal ways in which TNCs manage to shift income
towards low tax jurisdictions, and thereby reduce
effective tax rates, is through transfer pricing. Transfer
pricing involves manipulating the prices of intra-firm
transfers of goods and services so as to lower tax lia-
bilities in countries with high marginal tax rates, and
increase profits in countries where the tax liability is
correspondingly low. Over 80% of TNCs in one study
admitted to facing a transfer pricing inquiry from local
or foreign tax authorities at some point.5 Although it is
illegal in principle, in reality transfer pricing is very
hard for tax authorities to control. For many intra-firm
transfers, it is very difficult for local authorities to
establish a “correct” arms-length price. For instance,
some types of components or intermediate products
may be readily available on the open market, and thus
it is relatively easy to compare the price paid by a sub-
sidiary with the open market price. But other products
may be specific to a particular company, and thus
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3 A list of selected export processing zones in developing countries
elaborated by UNCTAD (1999  Annex  table A.IX.3) reveals a total
of 16 EPZs with across-the-board tax exemptions. A further 15
EPZs enjoy a 10 to 20 year tax holiday.   
4 See  for instance  the article by IMF economists Zee  Stotsky and
Ley (2002). 
5 Lorraine Eden (1998)  Taxing Multinationals  University of
Toronto Press  p.635  cited by Giddens (2000:102).
impossible to value in terms of a “market price”. This
leaves tax authorities with a dilemma. How should
they estimate the “correct” price of a product traded
between affiliates? These difficulties are compounded
when one considers that TNCs share all kinds of man-
agerial and innovative resources (e.g. patents). The
intangible nature of these goods and services means
that in practice it is impossible to assign costs accu-
rately between affiliates. It is not surprising, then, that
TNCs have considerable leeway to adjust intra-firm
prices so as to reduce tax liabilities to a minimum.
Notwithstanding all these difficulties, tax authorities
cling to the principle that for tax purposes each affiliate
of a TNC should be considered as an independent unit. 
Of course, in reality it has always been a fiction
to consider the subsidiaries of TNCs as free-standing
entities. As Vernon (1998, p.40) has commented, “in
the real world, the profit allocated to each country by
a multinational enterprise commonly is an artefact
whose size is determined largely by precedent and by
the debating skill of lawyers and accountants.” In an
increasingly globalized world, however, where sub-
sidiaries become deeply enmeshed in the international
network of the firm, this fiction is rapidly becoming
unsustainable. As we shall go on to show, it is also a
very costly fiction for the host countries.
This brief paper offers a proposal for a different
system of taxing TNC profits: unitary taxes. Briefly,
unitary tax systems involve using some notional allo-
cation of global profits instead of the declared profits
by individual subsidiaries. This makes sense because
the objective of the TNC is to maximize group profits;
company administrators are generally indifferent to
where those profits show up within the multinational
network. Under a unitary tax system, the amount of
profit taxes to be paid in each country would be
assigned according to some criterion such as the share
of each subsidiary in global sales, employment or
assets.6
Clearly, this kind of system would not avoid all
forms of tax avoidance. Action would still need to be
taken to counter the multitude of other (illegal)
methods of tax evasion. Fraudulent accounting
practices, like those evident in the WorldCom and
Enron scandals in the United States, would still be a
problem.7 But a unitary system would significantly
reduce the capacity of TNCs to shift profits from one
location to another at will. The system would have the
advantage of greater transparency, and would help to
increase the overall tax take, freeing up resources
which could be used to help achieve developmental
objectives such as the universal provision of basic
health and education. Although they may be reluctant
to admit it, such a system might even result in long-run
benefits for the TNCs themselves, reducing the need
for them to devote valuable managerial time and
resources to finding ways of minimizing their tax bills,
and instead allowing them to pay more attention to
building up the competitive strengths of their
companies.       
40
A PROPOSAL FOR UNITARY TAXES ON THE PROFITS OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS •  ANDREW MOLD
C E P A L R E V I E W  8 2  •  A P R I L 2 0 0 4
7 Ironically  of course  both the Enron and WorldCom cases meant
higher tax payments  because they involved the artificial inflation of
real profits - the losers in this case were principally the sharehold-
ers of the companies in question. For a prescient critical analysis of
Enron’s operations just before the scandal broke  see Bayliss and
Hall (2001).  
6 There is a risk in including labour in formula apportionment. The
imposition of a unitary tax system does not prevent different coun-
tries from imposing different corporate tax rates. Thus  in countries
with high relative corporate tax rates  formula apportionment based
on employment  may provide a perverse incentive for TNCs to sub-
stitute capital for labour  exaggerating a bias which already exists
within the TNC because of its relatively cheap access to capital.
Evidence on this point  from the U.S. experience  can be found in
Goolsbee and Maydew (1998).  Given the priority attached to
employment creation in both developing and industrialized coun-
tries  it may be better to base unitary taxes on an alternative indica-
tor or a combination of different variables (see section IV).
Studies on the determinants of foreign direct invest-
ment both in developing and industrialized countries
reveal that TNCs generally value highly locations
with good infrastructure, a well-educated workforce,
high-quality social services, etc.8 These are all public
goods which are best provided by governments. Yet,
at the same time, TNCs appear to be increasingly ret-
icent to pay their contribution towards financing these
public goods. In the United States, for example, cor-
porate income taxes as a percentage of gross earnings
fell from over 40% at the beginning of the 1960s to an
average of only 21.5% between 1990-1996 (Poterba,
1999, table 3).9 As a share of United States federal tax
revenue, corporate income taxes provided 32% of
total revenue in 1952, but by 1999 the figure was only
10% (Weisbrot, Naiman and Kim, 2000, p.15). For
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) as a whole, corporate taxes
now account for only 8% of fiscal revenue, equivalent
to just 3% of GDP (FitzGerald, 2001, p.7). 
There are basically two channels through which
globalization has facilitated such a big reduction in
tax rates. Firstly, the growing importance of trade that
takes place within the firm (i.e., between affiliates and
the parent company) is enhancing the ability of firms
with international operations to shift profits from one
tax jurisdiction to another. Intra-firm trade now
accounts for approximately a third of all world trade.
This creates enormous problems for the national tax
authorities, due to the use of “transfer prices” by
TNCs and the likelihood that these enterprises manip-
ulate these transfer prices to move profits to the juris-
dictions where taxes are low. Moreover, as Tanzi
(2000, p.18) observes, “under present tax arrange-
ments this problem is likely to grow. The tax authori-
ties of many countries are now worried about this
trend, but are often at a loss on what to do about it”. 
The other means by which TNCs are managing
to reduce their effective tax rates is the pressure on
governments to reduce taxation on internationally
mobile capital. Governments are increasingly putting
policies into place to attract foreign investment. Since
1991, a further 58 nations have begun to apply invest-
ment promotion policies, making a total of 116 coun-
tries that now do so (Moran, 1998, p.37). One of the
most popular measures for attracting foreign invest-
ment is the granting of tax concessions. As an
International Labour Organisation (ILO) report com-
ments, “in a world characterized by a decisive trend
towards “globalization”, where liberalization of trade
and capital flows has become increasingly prevalent,
the temptation for nation-States to engage in “com-
petitive de-taxation” and “competitive deregulation”
is self-evident” (ILO, 1997, p.70). Indeed, there are
growing fears that this process is degenerating into a
damaging “race to the bottom”, whereby the tax base
of States is gradually eroded and the remaining tax
burden falls disproportionately on non-mobile factors
(especially labour) (Kozul-Wright and Rowthorn,
1998; Radaelli, 1999).10
This trend is easily observable in statutory
corporation tax rates. In the past, countries typically
levied taxes on the net incomes of corporations at
marginal rates ranging from 30% to 50% (Caves,
1996, p.189). Moreover, there was little difference in
corporation tax rates between developing and
industrialized countries. In contrast, nowadays there
is evidence of a widening gap between OECD and
developing country rates. Few developing countries
apply corporate tax rates in excess of 20%. According
to estimates by Oxfam (2000), if developing countries
were applying OECD corporate tax rates their
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8 An extensive review of econometric studies on the locational
determinants of FDI is to be found in Mold (2000). 
9 In the United States case  at least  it may be misleading to attrib-
ute this fall in corporative income tax rates to trends related to glob-
alization: the main cause would seem to be the passing of the
Economic Recovery Act of 1981  which resulted in a sharp decline
in corporation tax rates (Poterba  1999  p.13). 
10 Of course  there is nothing new in these fears. In an article pub-
lished back in 1974 entitled “Coming Investment Wars”  Bergsten
was particularly prophetic on this point: “Many investments are
largely indifferent to location and hence close to zero-sum games;
in such cases a decision that is one party’s gain is another party’s
loss. Furthermore  world welfare may actually decline as a result of
some foreign investments  such as those induced primarily by host-
country tax preferences” (Bergsten  1974  p.145)
II
Evidence of tax avoidance by TNCs
revenues would be at least US$35 billion higher.11
But the changes are even more notable when effective
tax rates are calculated.12 For instance, calculations
carried out for this study on data for majority-owned
subsidiaries of United States firms reveal that on a
worldwide basis their average effective tax rates have
fallen from 49.6% of pre-tax income in 1983 to a mere
23.3% in 1998 (see Annex and figure 1).
FIGURE  1
Developed and developing countries:
Effective tax rates paid by United States
majority-owned affiliates, 1983 and 1999
(Porcentage)
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of United States
Department of Commerce data (see Annex).
Insofar as these figures probably substantially
underestimate true pre-tax income, real effective tax
rates are likely to be even lower. Moreover, whereas
effective tax rates were marginally higher in develop-
ing countries than in the industrialized countries in
1983, by 1998 that relationship had been inverted, and
effective rates were on average higher in developed
countries (19.9% versus 23.1%).13 Another point
which stands out from the figures calculated in the
Annex is the large dispersion in effective tax rates.
Thus, whereas in countries like Nigeria or Indonesia
the effective tax rates in 1999 were 53.3% and 32.2 %
respectively, for Luxembourg, Bermuda, Panama or
Switzerland the corresponding figures were only
2.5%, 2.8%, 0.5% and 5.7%. The incentive to shift
pre-tax profits towards the latter tax jurisdictions is
obviously very strong indeed.14, 15
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11 This figure was calculated using an estimated FDI inward stock
for developing countries of US$1219 billion. It was assumed that
that stock gave a rate of return of 20%  and the tax rate was set at a
typical OECD rate of 35%. On that basis  developing countries
should be receiving tax revenues of around US$85 billion a year
from foreign corporations  but they actually receive around US$50
billion per year at most. As the authors of the study concede  how-
ever  this is likely to be an extremely conservative estimate as not
only do official figures tend to understate the true value of FDI
stock  but also these figures fail to take account of the financial
transactions of large firms. 
12 Effective tax rates are defined as the ratio of foreign income
taxes to gross income (the sum of net income plus foreign income
taxes). If a high nominal rate of corporation tax is accompanied by
generous dispensations  then a large discrepancy can appear
between nominal and effective rates. From the point of view of the
companies themselves  what matters is obviously the effective rate.
13 These findings are broadly comparable with the conclusions of a
study carried out by Altshuler  Grubert and Newlon (1998) on the
average effective tax rates for large United States manufacturing
firms. Their study was based on data from the US Treasury corpo-
rate tax files between 1980 and 1992. They found that rates fell by
more than 15 percentage points between 1984 and 1992. Falls in
effective taxation rates were particularly sharp in many developing
countries. 
14 Some developing areas  in particular Africa  appear to have very
high effective tax rates. These figures do not necessarily reflect high
overall rates  however. Rather  they reflect the sectoral spread of
investment (principally in the oil and mining industries) where the 
share of gross income retained by the host government is relatively
high. Thus  in the case of Nigeria for instance  whereas the effective
rate for all industries was 32.4%  according to figures provided in
the aforementioned study by Altshuler  Grubert and Newlon (1998)
the effective tax rate for United States manufacturing firms in
Nigeria was only 13%. The high apparent tax rates on the oil and
mining sectors may also be the product of extensive transfer pricing
activity  giving a misleading impression of real effective tax rates. 
15 There is an important caveat to be made here. Some important
source countries of FDI provide foreign tax credits that can be off-
set against taxable income. For instance  the US government obtains
very little corporate tax revenue from the profits of US firms in
high-tax countries  since the taxable profits in those countries gen-
erate foreign tax credits that erase any residual US tax liability. By
contrast  a large fraction  roughly 40%  of US revenue from taxing
the foreign profits of United States corporations comes from taxing
their tax haven profits (Hines and Rice  1994  p.150). Thus  tax
credit systems can lead to the perverse result of larger tax payments
in the investor’s home country. Because of this phenomenon  in
some circles tax holidays have become known as “reverse foreign
aid” (Wells and Allen  2002  p.8). It would be interesting to extend
our analysis to countries which do not provide extensive tax credits
like France – we could expect much higher incentives to switch
profits to low tax jurisdictions in these cases.  
From the point of view of reducing the overall tax
take, the repercussions of such “investment wars” are
potentially very damaging for developing countries.
Tax breaks and holidays are becoming increasingly
generous. In some cases, such as Honduras, Jamaica,
Namibia and Senegal, firms have been granted perma-
nent tax exemptions. Tax holidays in export process-
ing zones have on occasions been stretched out to as
much as 20 years. Yet one of the ironies of offering
increasingly generous tax breaks is that the evidence
regarding the impact of tax regulations on business
location decisions is ambiguous. For instance, a
detailed study by Wells and Allen (2002) into the elim-
ination of tax holidays in Indonesia found no
detectable impact on the subsequent ability of the
country to attract substantial flows of foreign invest-
ment. Likewise, in an econometric study of the loca-
tional decisions taken by U.S. and Japanese manufac-
turing firms in 74 host countries, Kumar (1999) finds
scant evidence that lower tax rates or tax incentives
affect the decision to produce in developing countries.
Indeed, the results of some of Kumar's regressions
seem to suggest that higher tax rates were positively
related to higher levels of production by foreign sub-
sidiaries.16 Although there are obviously individual
cases where tax rates have affected the final decision,
on the whole TNCs seem to take a long-term view of
locational decisions, and are more likely to be swayed
by factors such as the quality of local infrastructure,
the availability of a well-educated workforce and,
probably most importantly of all, a dynamic local mar-
ket. 
Findings such as these lead credence to the idea
that governments have conceded too much to TNCs in
exchange for too little - tax competition is not even a
very effective way to attract long-term foreign invest-
ment. Indeed, there are other more effective ways of
attracting FDI rather than having to depend on tax
breaks. It has been suggested, for example, that a bet-
ter policy would be to support investment in human
capital, education, or local technological capacity
(MacEwan, 2001, pp.299-300). That way, if the sub-
sidiary is eventually closed, or lost to a country with a
lower tax rate, then at least the government retains the
benefits of the initial investment in terms of a better
educated workforce or an improved infrastructure. If
the only incentive offered is a low tax rate, all is lost if
the company finally decides to locate elsewhere.  
In addition, despite the great enthusiasm shown
by policymakers, for developing countries as a group
the potential gains to be reaped by attracting FDI
through tax breaks and reductions are probably limited.
For instance, it has been estimated that total employ-
ment in developing country Export Processing Zones
(EPZs) is no more than 4 million (Dicken, 1998,
p.131).17 Jobs in EPZs typically represent no more than
5% of total employment in the manufacturing sector of
developing countries: a tiny amount compared with the
estimated 300 million people who work in the "infor-
mal sectors" (Madeley, 1999, p.113). When one con-
siders that there are an estimated 1,200 million people
living on less than US$1 a day, it is clear that the poten-
tial impact of EPZs on poverty reduction is limited.18 It
is also no coincidence that, with the exception of
Mexico and China, the developing countries that have
made best use of these practices to attract foreign
investment tend to be relatively small island States
such as Mauritius. In short, as models which other
developing countries could follow, their relevance is
limited. Reviewing the evidence, one group  of IMF
economists conceded that “setting-up and/or maintain-
ing export processing zones is rarely advisable” (Zee,
Stotsky and Ley, 2002, p.1507). Yet governments of
developing countries have allocated substantial
amounts of scare funds, and forfeited a considerable
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16 For a recent review of these studies  see Morriset and Pirnia
(2002). It is true that some more recent studies do find a relation-
ship between fiscal pressure and investment studies: much would
seem to depend on how the tax variable is defined in the regression
analysis (effective tax rates would seem to have much stronger
explanatory power than nominal tax rates). Nonetheless  as Hines
(1996a  p.8) acknowledges  even in these studies the impact of tax
rates on the location and volume of investment still tends to be rel-
atively small.
17 Moreover  those jobs are highly concentrated geographically.
Mexico alone accounts for 600 000 jobs  and China too is responsi-
ble for a large share of total employment in EPZs. The vast majori-
ty of developing countries have an insignificant share in the
employment generated by such zones. 
18 There are of course all kinds of potential spillover effects to be
gained from the entry of foreign firms. But there is no automatic
guarantee that such positive spillovers will be forthcoming.
III
The implications for developing countries
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amount of tax income, to attract companies into EPZs. 
Of course, the proposal made in this paper to
revive the debate on unitary taxes can do little to avoid
tax competition and “investment wars”. That is a prob-
lem which clearly requires greater coordination
between tax authorities. But the transfer pricing prob-
lem can indeed be tackled through unitary taxes.
Developing countries are particularly susceptible to
income shifting of this kind. Much of their investment
stock is in primary industries. Sectors like the oil indus-
try are renowned for their ability to move funds in and
out of countries. Transfer pricing is facilitated by the
large volume of cross-border transactions in the mining
and oil sectors. Nor do developing country fiscal
authorities have the capacity to control transfer pricing
activities to the same extent as the developed countries.
There are a number of other incentives which
encourage TNCs to indulge in intensive transfer pric-
ing activity in developing countries. Although in the
past profit taxes have tended to be lower than in indus-
trialized countries, the level of ad valorem tariffs on
trade is still usually higher in developing countries. By
under-invoicing the true cost of intra-firm imports or
exports, TNCs often use transfer pricing to minimize
payments of trade duties. Similarly, as a way of pro-
moting the reinvestment of earnings in the host econo-
my, developing country governments have traditional-
ly imposed more restrictions on profit repatriation than
developed counties. In the face of such restrictions,
however, the transfer price mechanism has provided
TNCs with an alternative form of shifting income out
of a country (Grimwade, 2000, p.149).
To what extent is the potential for manipulation of
transfer prices actually used to the detriment of devel-
oping countries? Most of the empirical studies on this
subject date back to the 1970s and 1980s. But, as
Elson (1995, p.305) observes, the few systematic
investigations that have been carried out have all
shown that transfer prices are used to the detriment of
developing countries. For instance, one early study by
Vaitsos (1977) into the pharmaceutical industry in
Colombia revealed that reported profits accounted for
only 3.4% of effective returns; royalties for 14.0%,
and over-pricing for 82.6%. The additional cost of
pharmaceutical imports alone for the Colombian econ-
omy was estimated at US$20 million a year. In addi-
tion, there was a substantial loss of government tax
revenue - amounting to US$10 million a year - where
transfer pricing was used to under-report profits.
Investigations carried out by Lall and Streeten (1977,
p.153) confirmed this pattern of systematic overpric-
ing of imports by the pharmaceutical industry in
Colombia: some individual items were found to be
overpriced by up to 5,000-6,000%. Such practices
were also prevalent in the rubber and electrical indus-
tries. More recent studies have tended to focus on
comparisons of pre-tax profitability levels as an indi-
rect measure of transfer pricing activity. An extensive
study based on 1982 data carried out by Hines and
Rice (1994) into the profitability of US affiliates in 59
host countries revealed that on average a 1% higher
tax rate reduced the declared before-tax profitability
by 2.3%. 
It has often been argued that one way of mini-
mizing abusive transfer pricing activity of this kind is
to enforce joint ventures; local partners are hardly
likely to countenance the massive shifting of income
abroad. But the international liberalization of invest-
ment codes is making it increasingly difficult to
impose joint ventures on TNCs. Moreover, even where
local partners exist, they are often kept in the dark
regarding the structure of costs. The true level of prof-
itability is thus extremely difficult to gauge. As a for-
mer managing director of the Nigerian National
Petroleum Corporation, a joint venture with Shell,
commented: “proper cost monitoring of their [Shell’s]
operations has eluded us and one could conclude that
what actually keeps these companies in operation is
not the theoretical margin but the returns which they
build into their costs” (Obi and Soremekun, 1995,
cited in Frynas, 1998, p.20).    
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An alternative solution would be to impose taxes on
the consolidated results of the TNCs and distribute the
tax burden on the basis of some easily quantifiable
variable (such as sales, or fixed capital, etc.) instead of
on profits. In practice, the most common formula is to
allocate a corporation’s income on the basis of the
country’s average share in total sales, fixed capital and
labour remuneration. Expressed more formally, if π is
a TNC’s overall profit, then the profit attributed to
country j for tax purposes, πj, is 
where P is total assets, L is total employment and
S is total sales of the TNC, and Pj and Lj and Sj are the
assets, employment and sales within the tax jurisdic-
tion of the country in question, while α fj is the weight
of each factor ƒ in country j in the overall tax. In prac-
tice, the most common system of weighting used is a
third for each component. 
Unitary taxes of this kind would eliminate the
incentive to shift profits towards low tax jurisdictions.
Needless to say, a proposal of this nature would
inevitably provoke an indignant reaction on the part of
TNCs - past experience shows that these companies
are able to lobby aggressively on any issue that could
potentially affect their interests. Apart from political
expediency, however, there are few reasons for keep-
ing these issues off the agenda: revenue-creating ini-
tiatives like this are essential in order to strengthen the
fiscal position of the State in developing countries, and
there may also be significant payoffs for the developed
countries concerned. On the basis of the financial
reports of 46 U.S.-based TNCs, a recent study by
Shackelford and Slemrod (1998) estimates that the
application of unitary tax in the U.S. would have
increased those companies’ U.S. tax liabilities by 38%
percent, with the percentage increase being much
higher (81%) for oil and gas firms.     
Moreover, although TNCs may be initially reluc-
tant to admit it, a system of unitary taxes would even
hold certain advantages for them. Transfer pricing dis-
torts the ability of the firm to evaluate subsidiary per-
formance – the more the company resorts to transfer
pricing, the more difficult it becomes to determine
whether subsidiary profitability is due to the level of
productivity, or is simply an artifice of accounting.
Thus transfer pricing activity ends up distorting the
incentive structure within the firm: a subsidiary told to
charge a high transfer price for a good or service sup-
plied to another subsidiary will appear to doing better
than it actually is, while the subsidiary purchasing the
good or service will appear to be doing worse. Unless
this built-in bias is recognized when performance is
being evaluated, serious distortions in management
incentive systems can occur (Hill, 2000, p.625). In this
sense, TNCs themselves would gain through the
greater transparency of a unitary tax system. Unitary
taxes would also allow firms to concentrate on
strengthening their competitive advantages, instead of
wasting valuable managerial time and resources on
time-consuming tax avoidance strategies. Because of
the simplified nature of the system, unitary taxes also
have the potential for substantially reducing account-
ancy costs. As Phillip Gillett, tax controller at ICI, has
commented: “Commercially, transfer pricing makes
no sense. It forces us to spend a lot of time doing
things that are pointless from a business point of
view…Businesses want to organise as if there were a
single regional product market. Instead tax is deter-
mining how they organise themselves” (The
Economist, 2000, p.14). 
In addition, it is manifestly unfair that differences
in company performance should hinge to such a great
extent on the ability of company accountants to reduce
tax payments. In the aforementioned study by
McIntyre and Nguyen (2000), it was revealed that
competitors in various industries faced sharply vary-
ing effective tax rates. For example, Maytag and
General Electric both make kitchen appliances. But
whereas Maytag paid 35% of its profits in taxes from
1996 to 1998, GE paid only 8.1%. Likewise, Abbot
Laboratories and Pfizer are both in the drug business,
but the former paid almost 29% of its profits in taxes
from 1996 to 1998, while the latter paid only 3.1%.
This amounts to competitive sleight of hand, and is
unfair to shareholders. Unitary taxes would provide a
more level playing field.  
IV
Unitary taxes as a way of tackling tax evasion
Tax reforms are never easy: tax systems tend to evolve
in a topsy-turvy fashion, and although the outcome
often appears irrational and unjust to outsiders,
domestic political interests are created which often
stop well-intentioned reforms in their tracks. The
experience of the economist Nicholas Kaldor is
instructive here. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s
Kaldor took part in many tax missions to developing
countries. Although many of his proposals were based
on sound economic principles and would have provid-
ed the basis for a more equitable tax system, few coun-
tries were willing, or able, to follow his tax prescrip-
tions. In Ghana, for instance, Kaldor was asked by
Prime Minister Nkrumah to advise on the budgetary
position and tax system during the economic crisis
there in 1961. Kaldor wanted to reform company tax-
ation to prevent foreign firms escaping tax through
transfer pricing, and to introduce a scheme of compul-
sory saving to aid the development effort. Politically,
however, his proposals were untenable, and they led to
political agitation and a workers’ strike (Thirlwall,
2003, pp.522-524).    
Cautionary tales such as this are no reason for not
lobbying for change, however. Unitary taxes are not
innovative - they have been tried before - and in this
sense important lessons can be drawn from past expe-
rience.19 Indeed, it is one of the ironies of the process
of globalization that unitary taxes were first imple-
mented in the single most important source country of
FDI in the world - the United States. In fact, no state
in the U.S. attempts for tax purposes to measure the
within-state profits of multistate enterprises by requir-
ing separate accounting. Instead, all states use some
variety of formula to apportion total U.S. (and, in
some cases, worldwide) profits among the states
(Shackelford and Slemrod, 1998, p.41). In the 1980s
twelve U.S. states adopted a worldwide unitary tax.20
State legislators were aware of the ease with which
TNCs could avoid state profit taxes, simply by shifting
income towards states with a lower tax burden.
Unitary taxes were thus championed by state comp-
trollers as a way of minimizing tax avoidance through
transfer pricing. 
The political reaction against these measures was
almost immediate. The constitutionality of this method
of state taxation was questioned in the courts on
numerous occasions. At least twenty nations filed offi-
cial protests in the United States on behalf of TNCs,
complaining that the taxes subjected foreign firms to
double taxation, required burdensome accounting pro-
cedures, and forced TNCs to write detailed reports on
their global operations. As California is one of the
favourite locations for gaining a foothold in the United
States market, that state’s unitary tax legislation pro-
voked a particularly adverse response. As Vernon
(1998, p.42) noted, California’s initiative to abandon
any pretence to value tax liabilities using arms-length
prices on intra-firm transfers “horrified the interna-
tional community, almost as if the misguided state
authorities were breaching some infallible religious
principle”.21 Under fierce pressure from TNCs and for-
eign governments, every state but Alaska ended up
repealing unitary tax laws. 
Nonetheless, the lesson to be learned from the
United States experience is not that unitary taxes are
unpractical, nor politically untenable. Rather, the US
case demonstrates the need to apply unitary taxes
across the board. Because only a small majority of US
states imposed unitary taxes, TNCs were able to play
off one state against another, simply by threatening to
withdraw their investments. In the end, this pressure
paid dividends for the foreign TNCs. One of the first
states to repent was Oregon, which rescinded its uni-
tary tax in 1984. The incident which provoked a
reconsideration of the policy was the loss of an
important Japanese investment by automobile manu-
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V
Unitary taxes in practice
19 To our knowledge  the first author to argue that countries ought
to abandon the separate-accounting approach in favour of a formu-
la apportionment approach was Musgrave (1973). 
20 Much of this account of the United States experience in the
application of unitary taxes is drawn from Glickman and Woodward
(1989  pp.210-213). See also Hines (1996b). 
21 In the event  much of the outrage was exaggerated. For instance
despite Japanese TNCs’ well-known antipathy towards the state’s
unitary tax law  California managed to attract more Japanese invest-
ment than any other state. Of 295 new manufacturing plants
announced by Japanese companies from the early 1970s up to 1985
109 (37%) went to the Far West  with California dominating the pic-
ture (Glickman and Woodward  1989  p.210).
facturers Mitsubishi, an investment which finally
went to North Carolina.22 The campaign against the
unitary taxes reached a showdown in Sacramento,
where lobbyists for the TNCs argued that California
would lose investment dollars if the method of assess-
ment was not repealed. By the end of 1980s, only
Alaska had managed to resist the pressure to capitu-
late and abandon the unitary tax code.23
Arguably, however, the scenario would have
been very different if worldwide unitary taxes were
imposed across the 50 US states simultaneously. The
United States is such an important market for foreign
companies that a massive withdrawal of foreign
investments would have been inconceivable. The
same is also true of the European Union (EU)  - any
single member State acting on its own is likely to
have to confront a barrage of complaints and threats
from TNCs. But concerted action simultaneously on
the part of all fifteen member States would make it
very difficult for TNCs to take any evasive action. For
instance, the EU currently accounts for around 48%
of worldwide sales and 56% of value added produced
by United States affiliates abroad.24 It would consti-
tute an important strategic error on the part of most
TNCs to withdraw from such a market simply to
avoid tax payments.  
For developing countries, of course, the situation
is obviously more delicate - if they try to impose new
tax measures, they are far more likely to suffer the
consequences of retaliation on the part of TNCs. Even
here, however, experience suggests that the bark of the
multinationals is often worse than their bite.25 The
number of cases where multinationals have actually
pulled out of a country are relatively few. Even when
quite draconian measures have been imposed against
multinationals in developing countries, most have
stayed put.26 Anyhow, it is likely that the firms that
might be lost as a result of the change towards a uni-
tary tax system are precisely the firms that developing
countries should not be very eager to attract anyway:
highly mobile firms that do not care much about the
services (education, for example) that exist in their
host countries are not firms that are likely to make a
big contribution to development.27 In this sense, a uni-
tary tax system could even enhance the quality of for-
eign investment received.
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22 In fact  a report prepared for the state administration on the rea-
sons for the loss of the project to North Carolina concluded that ulti-
mately Oregon lost the plant because market proximity was the key
factor in the decision process  and Mitsubishi wanted to settle close
to the East Coast market. The officials also concluded that “while
the unitary tax was carefully evaluated by the Japanese  it does not
appear to have been a critical factor in their decision to build in
North Carolina rather than Salem” (cited in Glickman and
Woodward  1989  p.212). 
23 California  Montana and North Dakota also continue to have
worldwide unitary tax systems  but in these cases their use is option-
al for taxpayers (Hines  1996b  p.1079). 
24 Data taken from US Department of Commerce  U.S. Direct
Investment Abroad Benchmark Survey 1999 [http://www.bea.doc.
gov/bea/ai/newiid.htm].
25 For instance  in the March 2000 Budget  the British government
announced the prohibition of using mixer companies  which enable
British-based transnationals to lower their overall tax liabilities
(Grant  2000). The British government estimated that the change
would cost the transnationals some £300 million in extra tax pay-
ments. But the figure was strongly contested by business lobbies
which alleged that the total cost could run into several billion
pounds. Even the Financial Times  however  noted a “whiff of hys-
teria” surrounding private sector assessments of the impact of the
changes. In the event  the only concession that the Government
offered was a nine-month delay in the implementation of the new
measures. This case is especially interesting  because it demon-
strates the extent to which even a purportedly pro-business govern-
ment like the Blair administration is capable of making big business
back down if it is concerted in its action and is sure that it has got
its arguments right.
26 The most commonly cited examples of multinationals pulling out
of a developing country are the departure of IBM  Coca-Cola and
Exxon from India in the 1970s. But that dispute was related to
restrictions on majority ownership imposed by the Indian govern-
ment  and was in no way related to taxation issues.
27 I am grateful to Arthur MacEwan for this point.
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This paper has argued in favour of a new unitary tax
system on the profits of TNCs as a way of helping to
finance development-related expenditures on social
services and infrastructure. Back-of-the-envelope cal-
culations by Oxfam UK suggest that evasion of tax by
these companies is currently costing at least US$35 bil-
lion a year in lost revenues for developing countries.
Although not the only mechanism, transfer pricing is
one of the principal ways through which TNCs manage
to reduce their tax “exposure”. Unitary taxes would
eliminate the incentive to carry out this form of pricing. 
At the same time, it should be stressed that unitary
taxes do not take away the ability of countries or
regions to offer lower tax rates. As a part of regional
policy, for instance, it might be considered perfectly
acceptable to have lower corporate tax rates to avoid an
excessive concentration of economic activity and to
spread the benefits of economic growth toward less-
developed peripheral areas. Likewise, developing
countries could continue to offer lower tax rates as a
way of attracting internationally mobile investment. 
The advantage of the unitary tax system would be
its inherent transparency - it would be far more difficult
for firms to shirk their fiscal responsibilities.
Hopefully, business leaders too could be made to see
that a fair tax system in the long term is in their own
interests. Not only would a unitary tax system simplify
their accountancy practices, and allow them to concen-
trate valuable managerial time on strengthening their
competitive advantages, but they would also benefit in
numerous other ways from public expenditures on
infrastructure, social programmes, etc. By improving
the health and education of their employees, TNCs
could also be important beneficiaries of social expen-
ditures through higher productivity. The links are indi-
rect, of course, and the benefits long-term ones, but the
preference of direct investors for developed market
economies with high levels of social protection surely
suggests that responsible companies are aware of these
potential benefits, and are usually prepared to make a
fair contribution to funding them.  
Although coordination would obviously be desir-
able, it is worth stressing that the imposition of a uni-
tary tax system by any single country or group of coun-
tries does not in principle require greater coordination
between tax authorities or exhaustive international
negotiations. Consolidated results are always required
by company shareholders, no matter where the multi-
national is registered. Of course, different accounting
conventions mean that reported profits will vary
depending on where the company is inscribed, and for
the efficient working of a unitary system, it would be
convenient that all companies followed the same
accounting practices. But the failure to have a com-
pletely homogeneous accounting system at the interna-
tional level would not impede the application of a uni-
tary tax by any country or set of countries which
wished to apply it (though they might wish to pressure
multinationals within their territory to abide by either
America’s generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) or the London-based International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB)).28
Fortunately, concerns over tax evasion are com-
mon to both developing and industrialized countries.
The globalization of markets is giving rise to fears that
traditional forms of raising revenues are increasingly
threatened. An initiative to resolve these problems is
thus far more likely to succeed. Concern about current
trends has been expressed even within the IMF: an
institution not normally associated with worries over
the impact of low taxation rates. One recent paper by
Fund economist Vito Tanzi (2000) warns: “while the
fiscal house is still standing and looks solid, one can
visualize many fiscal termites that are busily gnawing
at its foundations”. The ability of TNCs to indulge in
illegal transfer pricing activity is undoubtedly one of
the fiscal termites to which Tanzi refers.
Of course, whatever its merits, the proposal on
unitary taxes would meet with much opposition
amongst business lobby groups. However, the argu-
ments in favour of unitary taxes are sufficiently strong
to prevent these political pressures from sidetracking a
reform along these lines. So far, all efforts to reform tax
codes have been directed towards eliminating interna-
tional double taxation: measures which international
28 Depending on which of these two accounting systems is used
discrepancies in the reported profits can often be large. In the after-
math of the Enron and WorldCom scandals  the probability of the
IASB standards gaining the upper hand has been enhanced consid-
erably. See The Economist (2002). 
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investors have obviously been very keen to support. In
view of the evidence regarding the fall in effective tax
rates paid by TNCs, this emphasis is manifestly unfair.
Against this backdrop, the imposition of unitary taxes
would provide an important impetus to reform.
International legislation should provide the basis for
levelling up of standards, rather than levelling down, as
it has tended to do up to now. One possibility to make
the proposal politically more palatable may be to lower
corporate tax rates through unitary taxes. TNCs might
be more prepared to countenance a unitary tax system
if the base rates were lower. From the point of view of
governments, too, it might be preferable to have a
lower rate, but to achieve more efficient revenue col-
lection.
The European Union is in a good position to take
action on this issue. Although progress has been slow
up until now, there is a growing consensus on the need
to take action to prevent tax competition and tax eva-
sion among member States (Radaelli,1999). The impo-
sition of a Europe-wide unitary tax system would pro-
vide a much-needed impetus to tax reform. Action by
the EU along these lines would set a good precedent
which other countries could then follow. Bearing in
mind the fact that approximately 85% of TNCs are
incorporated in OECD countries, the OECD also rep-
resents a good forum for proposing a shift towards uni-
tary taxes. So far, attempts to approve an international
legal framework for FDI, such as the OECD’s ill-fated
Multinational Agreement on Investment (MAI), have
only contributed to relaxing controls on foreign com-
panies. In this context, a proposal to strengthen the
ability of nation States to raise a fair share of taxes on
the operations of TNCs might be sufficient to tip the
balance in favour of any future agreement: support for
the initiative would be broader, and developing coun-
tries would feel that they are not merely conceding
ground to the TNCs, but also gaining something out of
the agreement. Bold initiatives such as this are clearly
required to restore greater fairness and equity to the
global economic system, and should be part and parcel
of any future proposals.
(Original: English)
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Annex
World: Effective tax rates on United States majority owned affiliates, 1983 and 1999
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
1983 1999 % change 
Foreign income Net Effective Foreign income Net Effective in effective
taxes income tax rate taxes income tax rate 1983-1999 
(1) (2) (1)/[(1)+(2)] (1) (2) (1)/[(1)+(2)] tax rate
All countries 30 122 30 600 49.6 45 791 160 490 22.2 -55.3
Canada 3 700 5 588 39.8 6 676 14 951 30.9 -22.5
Europe 12 075 12 503 49.1 22 464 91 467 19.7 -59.9
Austria 47 80 37.0 259 599 30.2 -18.4
Belgium 265 453 36.9 916 2 570 26.3 -28.8
Denmark 65 175 27.1 234 790 22.9 -15.6
Finland 38 54 41.3 161 282 36.3 -12.0
France 736 666 52.5 2 089 3 610 36.7 -30.2
Germany 1 316 1 766 42.7 3 513 8 375 29.6 -30.8
Greece 13 25 34.2 153 204 42.9 25.3
Ireland 31 1 090 2.8 1 141 13 147 8.0 188.8
Italy 488 744 39.6 1 869 2 235 45.5 15.0
Luxembourg 32 88 26.7 100 3 906 2.5 -90.6
Netherlands 486 494 49.6 1 825 15 669 10.4 -79.0
Norway 2 197 827 72.7 1 022 1 052 49.3 -32.2
Portugal 25 29 46.3 258 939 21.6 -53.4
Spain 137 16 89.5 899 2 439 26.9 -69.9
Sweden 132 169 43.9 424 1 617 20.8 -52.6
Switzerland 233 1 504 13.4 653 10 713 5.7 -57.2
Turkey 26 39 40.0 127 118 51.8 29.6
United Kingdom 5 800 4 197 58.0 6 266 22 602 21.7 -62.6
Others 2 842 2 805 50.3 165 460 26.4 -47.5
Latin America
and other western 2 509 5 129 32.8 4 481 26 000 14.7 -55.2
hemisphere countries 
South America 1 648 1 003 62.2 1 540 3 012 33.8 -45.6
Argentina 47 392 10.7 375 350 51.7 383.1
Brazil 740 268 73.4 553 880 38.6 -47.4
Chile 59 50 54.1 172 586 22.7 -58.1
Colombia 185 125 59.7 227 475 32.3 -45.8
Ecuador - 61 - 25 27 48.1 -
Peru 125 119 51.2 83 14 85.6 67.0
Venezuela 196 -41 126.5 39 642 5.7 -95.5
Others - 28 - 66 37 64.1 -
Central America 422 517 44.9 2 297 6 979 24.8 -44.9
Costa Rica - - - 37 40 48.1 -
Honduras - - - 22 26 45.8 -
Mexico 274 -229 608.9 2 179 4 805 31.2 -94.9
Panama 85 648 11.6 10 1 939 0.5 -95.6
Others 62 98 38.8 49 170 22.4 -42.3
Other western
hemisphere countries 439 3 610 10.8 644 16 009 3.9 -64.3
Barbados 7 141 4.7 158 1 337 10.6 123.4
Bermuda 36 1 664 2.1 238 8 175 2.8 33.6
Dominican Rep. 9 26 25.7 15 509 2.9 -88.9
Netherlands Ant. 221 1 283 14.7 - - - -
(continuation)
1983 1999 % change 
Foreign income Net Effective Foreign income Net Effective in effective
taxes income tax rate taxes income tax rate 1983-1999 
(1) (2) (1)/[(1)+(2)] (1) (2) (1)/[(1)+(2)] tax rate
Trinidad and Tobago 140 100 58.3 - - - -
Common wealth 
islands of the
Caribbean 1 286 0.3 85 4 817 1.7 397.7
Others 27 110 19.7 148 1 171 11.2 -43.1 
Africa 4494 724 86.1 2 039 2 242 47.6 -44.7
Egypt (D) 515 125 461 21.3 -
Nigeria 1 421 357 79.9 1 096 960 53.3 -33.3
South Africa 272 388 41.2 99 169 36.9 -10.4
Others 4 494 724 86.1 720 652 52.5 -39.1
Middle East 2 162 516 80.7 1 022 1 343 43.2 -46.5
Israel 53 90 37.1 110 342 24.3 -34.3
Saudi Arabia 461 104 81.6 29 206 12.3 -84.9
United Arab Emirates 1 618 292 84.7 133 163 44.9 -47.0
Others 29 31 48.3 751 632 54.3 12.3
Asia and Pacific 7 810 9 261 45.8 9 054 24 126 27.3 -40.4
Australia 989 597 62.4 1 020 3 157 24.4 -60.8
China - - 249 912 21.4 -
Hong Kong 73 662 9.9 450 4 111 9.9 -0.7
India 32 21 60.4 134 -27 125.2 107.4
Indonesia 2 383 1 779 57.3 1 069 2 249 32.2 -43.7
Japan 764 776 49.6 4 136 4 848 46.0 -7.2
Korea  Republic of 31 88 26.1 361 787 31.4 20.7
Malaysia 213 431 33.1 228 1 601 12.5 -62.3
New Zealand 37 74 33.3 78 106 42.4 27.2
Philippines 83 59 58.5 214 724 22.8 -61.0
Singapore 109 631 14.7 524 3 905 11.8 -19.7
Taiwan 43 184 18.9 297 980 23.3 22.8
Thailand 36 40 47.4 218 647 25.2 -46.8
Others 3 017 3 919 43.5 78 127 38.0 -12.5
International 104 384 21.3 55 360 13.3 -37.8
Addenda:
European Uniona 9 232 9 698 48.8 20 106 78 984 20.3 -58.4
OPECb 8 342 2 690 75.6 2 996 4 648 39.2 -48.2
Developed countriesc 17 565 19 538 47.3 34 374 114 529 23.1 -51.2
Developing countriesd 12 557 11 062 53.2 11 417 45 961 19.9 -62.6
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of US Department of Commerce data [http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/ai/newiid.htm].
a Consisted of 10 countries in 1983 and 15 in 1999.
b Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
c Developed countries include Europe  Canada  Australia  New Zealand and Japan.
d Developing countries include the rest of the world.
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